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NOTE

FIRING BACK: STATE V. HUCKELBA TAKES AIM AT
PRECEDENT, IMPACTING THE GUN RIGHTS OF NORTH
CAROLINA CITIZENS
THOMAS C. WOLFF*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Courts have long been reluctant to impose strict criminal liability in cases
where a statute does not explicitly require proof of guilty intent on the part
of an actor. Instead, they prefer to 'read into' a statute a requirement that
the actor had some knowledge of a wrongful act.' The court's hesitation is
centered on its desire to prevent the criminalization of certain conduct that
would otherwise be innocent but for the guilty intent behind the act, while
still carving out exceptions when it concerns the regulation of public welfare.2 On the surface, the protection of public welfare seems simple enough
to delineate, however, it is easily muddled when considered
in the context
3
of constitutional protections provided to gun owners.
The recent case of State v. Huckelba4 brought back to light a 2003 decision by the North Carolina Court of Appeals, which had previously allowed
a strict liability approach to N.C. GEN. STAT. §14-269.2 (2011), holding
that there was no need to prove an "element of criminal intent or mens rea"
behind the defendant's possession of a firearm while on educational property.5 In light of a recent amendment to the statute, the court in Huckelba
* Thomas C. Wolff, North Carolina Central University School of Law, J.D., expected 2017; East
Carolina University, B.A., Philosophy, 2007. 1 would like to dedicate this article to my devoted wife,
Michelle Wolff, for being my inspiration and for her endless patience and encouragement. I would also
like to thank my loving family for their continued support throughout my law school experience.
1. See Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419 (1985).
2. See Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 610 (1994) ("[We have taken care] to avoid construing a statute to dispense with mens rea where doing so would 'criminalize a broad range of apparently innocent conduct."').
3. See id. at 634.
4. State v. Huckelba, 771 S.E.2d 809 (N.C. Ct. App. 2015).
5. State v. Haskins, 585 S.E.2d 766, 768 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003), overruled by Huckelba, 771
S.E.2d at 823 (citing In re Cowley, 461 S.E.2d 804, 806 (1995)) (noting the purpose of the statute was
to deter individuals from bringing guns onto school grounds because of the "increased necessity for
safety in our schools").
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educational properread a mental requirement into the element of being
6 on
ty, and overturned the holding in State v. Haskins.
This case note will consider the implications of the decision in Huckelba
and the lasting effect that it will have on regulating the use of firearms. 7 In
doing so, this note will explore the holding of Huckelba as well as the case
law and legislative intent used by the North Carolina Court of Appeals in
reaching its decision.8 Finally, the note will discuss the firm stance that this
court has taken in refusing to impose strict criminal liability for possession
of guns on educational property, and will investigate its effect on the interests of public safety in North Carolina schools. 9
II.

THE CASE

The appeal in this case was based on a conviction of three counts of misdemeanor and one count of felony possession of a weapon on campus or
other educational property under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-269.2(b).10 While
being questioned, Defendant freely admitted to a police officer that she was
in possession of a loaded firearm located in the glove box of her car." After
waiving her Miranda rights, Defendant admitted that she knew that she was
not allowed to have the gun on campus.1 2 Defendant knew from her 'concealed carry' permit classes that possession of a firearm on campus was
prohibited by law, however, she believed that her car was not parked on
campus.13 To her credit, she was parked in a lot that had no security
measures and was a considerable distance from both the main academic and
residential areas of the campus of High Point University (the "University").1 4 However, the parking lot was in front of a University administrative
5

building and still considered part of the University's campus.'
At trial, Defendant did not present any evidence and moved to dismiss,
adamantly denying that she had any knowledge that she was on educational
property. 6 The statute read in pertinent part: "It shall be a Class I felony
for any person knowingly to possess or carry, whether openly or concealed,
any gun, rifle, pistol, or other firearm of any kind on educational proper-

6. Huckelba, 771 S.E.2d at 822-23.
7. Id. at 825.

8. Id.
9. Id.at823.
10. Id. at 812.
11. Id. at813.

12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.at 812.

15. Id. (noting that the parking lot was two miles from the main campus).
16. Id.at813.
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ty.' 17 However, there was no indication (or any standing precedent) as to
whether the guilty state of mind should be read into the statute for the "educational property" element.'s The jury was instructed to find the defendant
guilty if she possessed a gun on educational property regardless of whether
she was aware she was on campus property.19
After being found guilty on all four weapons charges, Defendant claimed
there was plain error in the jury instructions when the trial court "failed to
instruct the jury on the proper mental state" as it relates to the element of
the crime concerning "on educational property." 20 She claimed that the jury
should have been properly instructed to find her not guilty if they believed
she was not knowingly on educational property. 2'
Convinced that it was not in the intent of the legislation to criminalize
this kind of conduct, the North Carolina Court of Appeals held that the "trial court committed plain error by failing to require the jury to consider
whether the State met its burden of proving that Defendant was knowingly
on educational property when she possessed the Ruger pistol. '' 22 The Court
of Appeals followed a line of Fourth Circuit cases that allowed the
knowledge requirement to be read into a statute, even though that statute
lacked a specific mens rea requirement as to the educational property element. 23 The court based its decision on the legislative purpose in enacting
the statute, which was to "prevent the presence of guns on educational
' 24
property - not to prevent individuals from possessing or carrying guns.
The Huckelba court followed those precedent cases, holding that a conviction requires the defendant to know that she was on educational property
because it is that specific knowledge that converts an otherwise innocent act
25
into a crime.
On April 21, 2015, the North Carolina Court of Appeals ultimately reversed Defendant's conviction and remanded the case for a new trial,
whereby the jury would be instructed to consider the knowledge requirement for the "educational property" element of the statute.26

17.

N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-269.2(b) (2011).

18. Huckelba, 771 S.E.2d at 815.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21.

Id.

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Id. at 825.
Id. at 819-20.
Id. at 822-23.
Id. at 819.
Id. at 826.
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BACKGROUND

State v. Huckelba was not the first case to ask the North Carolina Court
of Appeals to decide whether N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-269.2 is meant to include a mens rea element. 27 In 2003, the court in State v. Haskins definitively held that "N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-269.2 does not include a mens rea
element," thereby relieving the State of the burden of proving that the defendant had any guilty intent behind their actions. 28 The Haskins court specifically approved of a strict liability view of the statute when they rejected
the appellant's argument that the element of criminal intent or mens rea
should be read into the statute on the basis that "strict liability offenses are
disfavored in our criminal jurisprudence., 29 This landmark decision had
significant consequences for the interpretation of the statute, which under
its original construction in 1993 read, "it shall be a Class I felony for any
person to possess or carry, whether openly or concealed, any gun, rifle,
pistol, or other firearm of any kind.. . on educational property." 0 At that
time, the statute did not expressly require specific intent or knowledge on
the part of the defendant and the court chose to not read it into the statute,
even though the decision was in contrast to previous litigation in the United
States Supreme Court and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit. 3
The principal argument has historically been rooted in the common law
presumption that "criminal culpability requires a guilty mind, or some
knowledge that the actor is performing a wrongful act.' 32 The Supreme
Court decision in Liparota v. UnitedStates was the first case to address "the33
extent to which a mental state requirement should be 'read into' a statute."
Without any indication of "congressional purpose" on the issue, the Court
forced the State to prove the defendant had a guilty state of mind for his
possession and use of unauthorized food stamps in an unauthorized man-

27. See State v. Haskins, 585 S.E.2d 766, 770 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003).
28. Id. (using precedent set by the U.S. Supreme Court).
29. Id. at 768.
30. Huckelba, 771 S.E.2d at 821 (citing Crimes-Possession of Firearms or Explosives on Educational Property, Ch. 558, § i, 1993 N.C. Sess. Laws 558 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-269.2.
(1993) (prior to 2011 amendment)).
31. See Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 426 (1985) (declining to impose a strict liability
standard to avoid criminalizing conduct that would be otherwise innocent); United States v. Figueroa,
165 F.3d III, 116 (2d Cir. 2000) (reading a mcns rea requirement into a statute); United States v.
Forbes, 64 F.3d 928, 932 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding a defendant must have knowledge of the fact that
turns an innocent act into a crime).
32. Huckelba, 771 S.E.2d at 816.
33. Id. at 817 (citing Liparota, 471 U.S. at 426).
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ner. 34 The Court reasoned that to "interpret the statute otherwise would be
to criminalize a broad range of apparently innocent conduct."" This holding sought to prevent the government from prosecuting those individuals
that would have used a food stamp in a "manner not authorized by [the statute] or the regulations" even though they were unaware that their conduct
was in violation of a federal regulation.36
Following that decision, there was a series of cases that came before the
federal courts in which they acted consistent to the Liparota holding.3 7 In
Figueroa v. United States, the court similarly held that the government
must prove a defendant had knowledge of certain facts to avoid criminalizing innocent conduct. 38 The court rationalized on the basis that federal
criminal statutes are "normally read to contain a mens rea requirement that
attaches to enough elements of the crime that together would be sufficient
to constitute an act in violation of the law." 39 This holding reaffirmed the
precedent set by Liparota, choosing to avoid criminalizing conduct that
would not amount to an actual crime absent any guilty intent.40
However, the United States Supreme Court has recognized an exception
to the rule, most notably applied in United States v. Freed, which allowed
prosecution of a crime without any "specific intent or knowledge" for those
regulatory activities "affecting public health, safety, and welfare."41 This
allowed the Court to find it sufficient that the defendant knew he was in
possession of a grenade without any specific proof that he knew it was unregistered. 42 They reasoned that it was common knowledge for an individual to know that possession of a hand grenade is not an innocent act, and
therefore it was viewed as a "regulatory measure in the interest of public
safety. ' 43
Going against precedent set by the United States Supreme Court in Liparota, the North Carolina Court of Appeals decision in Haskins declined to
34. Liparota, 471 U.S. at 434 (interpreting statute to criminalize anyone who possessed or used
unauthorized food stamps in a manner that was in violation of any statute or regulation, but only if they
knew they were violating another statute).
35. Id. at 426 (reasoning that strict interpretation could result in convictions for those who sought
to use stamps received through clerical error without knowledge of the mistake).
36. Id. at 426 (citing 7 U.S.C. § 2014 (2014)).
37. Huckelba, 771 S.E.2dat 816.
38. Figueroa, 165 F.3d at 116 (holding that the government must prove that the defendant knowingly aided an alien to enter the country and that he knew the alien was excludable).
39. Id. at 116.
40. Liparota,471 U.S., at 426.
41. United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 609 (1971).
42. Freed, 401 U.S. at 604 (citing 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) (2006) ("[l]t shall be unlawful for any
person to receive or possess a firearm which is not registered to him in the National Firearms Registration and Transfer Record.")).
43. Id. at 609.
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read a mental state requirement into N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-269.2.4 The
court's holding was driven in large part due to public policy as they felt that
restricting possession of guns and weapons on educational property fell in
line with the exception used in Freed, reasoning that the purpose of N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 14-269.2 was for "'deter[ing] students and others from bringgrounds' because of 'the increased necessiing any type of gun onto school
45
ty for safety in our schools. ,,

This decision flew in the face of Staples v. United States, where the United States Supreme Court specifically declined to extend the "public safety"
exception to cases involving gun use.46 The Court clarified that unlike hand
grenades, the possession of a lawful firearm falls under the umbrella of
"apparently innocent conduct" which should not be criminalized by dispensing with the mens rea in construing a statute.47 They acknowledged
that there are different categories of guns that may be legally possessed
which are much more dangerous and powerful than others. 48 However,
they firmly held that although some guns may harbor much greater potential for destruction, it "cannot be said to put gun owners sufficiently on notice of the likelihood of regulation to justify" the interpretation of the 'statute
49
to not require "proof of knowledge of [that] weapon's characteristics.
The Court carefully dismissed the argument laid out by the government,
who pleaded that automatic firearms are "highly dangerous devices that
should alert their owners to the probability of regulation," and instead relied
on the long held principle of avoiding the criminalization of otherwise innocent conduct.50 In their finding, the Court held that "[e]ven dangerous
items can, in some cases, be so commonplace and generally available that
we would not consider them to alert individuals to the likelihood of strict
regulation." 5'
Staples essentially prevented the application of the "public welfare" exception to those cases involving any gun that could be lawfully obtained
and owned, however, it did not do so explicitly and definitively.5 2 This
gave the Haskins court the ability to declare gun use on educational property as an exception for the good of public welfare and safety, while ignoring
44. Haskins, 585 S.E.2d at 770 ("[W]e conclude N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-269.2 does not include a
mens rea element.").
45. Id. at 768-69 (citing In re Cowley, 461 S.E.2d 804, 806 (1995)).
46. See Staples v. United States, 411 U.S. 600 (1994) (involving a defendant who modified his
unregistered weapon to allow for automatic firing capabilities).
47. Id. at 610.

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id. at 611 (mentioning "machineguns, sawed-off shotguns, and artillery pieces").
Id. at 612 (construing 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d)).
Id. at 610.
Id. at 61I.
Huckelba, 771 S.E.2dat 818.
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any potential criminalization of otherwise lawful gun possession.53 The
court articulated that "the statute was enacted 'because of the increased
necessity for safety in our schools,' and therefore, it falls under the subset
of crimes for which 'the U.S. Supreme Court has upheld 54the imposition of
criminal penalties without the finding of criminal intent."'
Significant change came to the North Carolina gun laws in 2011, through
legislation which greatly expanded the rights to use firearms to individuals
and ultimately modified N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-269.2." The statute was
amended to include the word 'knowingly' to its construction so it would
read: "It shall be a Class I felony for any person knowingly to possess or
carry, whether openly or concealed, any gun, rifle, pistol, or other firearm
of any kind on educational property or to a curricular or extracurricular
activity sponsored by a school. 56 It was this slight change that gave the
court in Huckelba the power to overturn the holding of Haskins." Using a
series of Fourth Circuit cases, the court in Huckelba dismissed the decision
in Haskins and held that "under each relevant principle of statutory construction, the 'knowingly' mental state in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-269.2(b)
must modify both clauses 'possess or carry' and 'on educational property.'
t,58

The court agreed with the early United States Supreme Court holdings of
Liperota and Figueroa by acknowledging "the 'knowingly' mens rea requirement must attach to enough elements of the statute to make the commitment of that act illegal," thereby reassuring that the mere possession of a
gun could not be criminalized unless there was a "violation of one of North
Carolina's other gun laws." 59 Further, the court explicitly declined to apply
the public welfare exception used in Haskins, relying on those Constitutional protections to own firearms and carry them "in accordance with the
law." 6 This decision was fueled by three pivotal Fourth Circuit cases,
which bolstered the idea that a mental state requirement should be read into
the statute and only excepted in very limited circumstances concerning public welfare regulation.6'
The holding in Huckelba relied primarily on United States v. Forbes,
which reinforced the idea that the lack of knowledge about a particular ele53. Haskins, 585 S.E.2d at 769.
54. Huckelba, 771 S.E.2d at 821-22.
55. Id. at 822.
56. Id. (citing Weapons--Self Defense--Presumptions, § 4, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 268 (codified at
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-269.2 (2011) (emphasis added)).
57. Id.
58. Id. at816.
59. Id. at817.
60. Id. at 817-18.
61. Id. at819.
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ment is what converts the "innocent act into a crime., 62 The court felt the
criminalization of otherwise innocent conduct involving a firearm was "essentially the same issue" in each case.63
The Huckelba court distanced itself from United States v. Langley, which
refused to read a mental requirement into the statute that convicted a felon
who possessed a firearm and moved it through interstate commerce. 64
Langley allowed the imposition of a strict liability standard based on (i) the
fact that there was a history of doing so under the statute, and they felt (ii)
the "congressional intent of the statute" would not have made it "easier for
felons to avoid prosecution." 65 However, Langley was distinguishable, as
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-269.2 did not have any similar history of consistently
imposing a strict liability standard.66
Finally, in United States v. Cook, the court recognized an exception for
conduct that was subject to public regulation and imposed a strict liability
standard, but Huckelba distinguished itself by holding that doing so would
"impinge on constitutionality protected conduct," a concern that was simply
not present in Cook.67 Cook reasoned that the defendant should have been
"well aware that their conduct [was] subject to public regulation" as the
case involved receiving illegal drugs, whereas in Huckelba, the court did
not feel the defendant should have been aware of any such regulation.6 8
In finding the legislative intent behind adopting the 2011 amendment to
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-269.2 was to "enhance the Second Amendment
rights of North Carolina citizens, not to hinder those rights by allowing for
convictions under the statute without proof of an evil mind," the Huckelba
court found that the word knowingly should modify both the possession
element and the "on educational property" element of N.C. GEN. STAT. §
14-269.2(b). 69 Additionally, the court chose to align itself with the holding
of Staples and refused to apply the public welfare exception in this case,
strengthening the argument that it should not apply to lawful gun ownership
70
in order to avoid the criminalization of otherwise innocent conduct.

62. United States v. Forbes, 64 F.3d 928, 932 (4th Cir. 1995) (involving defendant convicted for
transporting a firearm without any knowledge that he was under indictment for another crime).
63. Huckelba, 771 S.E.2d at 819.
64. Id. at 819.
65. Id. at 819.
66. Id. at 819.
67. Id. at 820 (referencing lawful gun possession under the Constitution).
68. United States v. Cook, 76 F.3d 596, 601 (4th Cir. 1996) (involving defendant who sold illegal
drugs, but did not know his partner was a minor).
69. Huckelba, 771 S.E.2d at 822 (applying a plain reason standard to the statute, the court determined that the legislature could not have intended to both expand the rights to possess guns while permitting enforcement of strict criminal liability for those who violate a gun law unknowingly).
70. Id. at819.
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ANALYSIS

The decision of State v. Huckelba to overturn the holding of Haskins has
7
broad legal implications on the rights of gun owners in North Carolina. 1
This decision highlights North Carolina's relaxed policy toward gun owners' rights, and shows a sharp turnaround in the court's view on gun control
in the North Carolina school system even in light of recent tragedies involving weapons on educational property.72 It demonstrates a willingness to
ease the burden that is placed on North Carolina's gun owners and alleviate
them of some of the responsibility that comes along with carrying a weapon, including those that hold a 'concealed carry' permit. Ignoring the interests of public welfare, the Huckelba court quashed any argument supporting
stricter regulation for possessing guns on educational property when they
held that the imposition of strict criminal liability would be a violation of
those rights guaranteed to gun owners because of the danger of criminalizing a broad range of apparently innocent conduct.73
First, the court makes a definitive turn away from a more strict policy
towards gun ownership, bearing in mind the growing number of school
shootings in recent years such as Columbine, Virginia Tech, and Sandy
Hook.74 The 2011 bill, in addition to modifying the text of N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 14-269.2, granted numerous other protections to gun owners by (i)
codifying the "Castle Doctrine," which gave citizens the ability to use deadly force "in defense of one's home, motor vehicle, or workplace," (ii) allowed concealed handgun permit holders to "carry guns at State parks and
State-owned rest stops," as well as granting (iii) "non-law enforcement
State officials" the right to carry without many limitations that other permit
holders are subject to. 75 Huckelba highlights the intent behind the 2011
bill, as an attempt "to enhance the Second Amendment rights of North Carallowing for convictions under
olina citizens, not to hinder those rights by
76
the statute without proof of an evil mind.,
However, this view is in stark contrast to what the Haskins court explained as the legislative intent behind the statute (before it was modified). 77 While the court in Haskins held firmly that the purpose of the statute was to "'deter[] students and others from bringing any type of gun onto
school grounds' because of 'the increased necessity for safety in our
71. See id.at 823.
72. Id. at 821-22.
73. Id. at 821-22.
74. Jen Christensen,

Why the U.S. has the most mass shootings, CNN (August 28, 2015),

http://www.cnn.com/2015/08/27/health/u-s-most-mass-shootings/.
75. Huckelba, 711 S.E.2d at 822 n.9.
76. id. at 822.
77. Haskins, 585 S.E.2d at 769.
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schools,"' in Huckelba, the court used its reading of the legislative intent
behind the 2011 bill to undo the protective precedent that had been established.78
Although some jurisdictions would seek to create stricter laws to protect
our nation's schools, North Carolina is retreating to a pre-Haskins approach
of protecting the gun owners' rights without regard to public interest. 79 The
Haskins court sought to bring significant change to North Carolina by allowing strict criminal liability in an attempt to protect the State's schools,
by relying on the existing 'public safety and welfare' exception to the requirement of a guilty mind in criminal offenses.80 That court felt that public policy demanded stricter regulation on school grounds in order to deter
81
people from bringing guns on school property in the interest of safety.
Huckelba, on the other hand, does not see the necessity for increased safety
in our schools as the driving force behind N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-269.2; they
see it as an expansion of gun owners' rights in light of the 2011 bill. 2
Astonishingly, a mere eight days after a fatal shooting on the campus of
Wayne Community College (a North Carolina school), 83 the Huckelba court
overturned the Haskins decision and chose to favor the rights of gun owners
over the interest of public welfare and school safety.8 4 In a nation where
shootings in schools and other public places seem to be occurring more
frequently, Huckelba has refuted Haskins' attempt to create restrictions in
order to enhance protection for those on school property.85
In bolstering the rights of those gun owners, the court has placed the burden on the State to prove that the defendant had knowledge of their location, rather than placing the burden on the responsible gun owner to be
aware of whether or not they are violating a statute by carrying a weapon in
a forbidden area, namely educational property. Although North Carolina
educates those gun owners who seek to obtain a concealed carry permit
through mandatory additional safety courses, it is choosing not to hold them
accountable for their actions when they are unknowingly in violation of a
statute. For the gun owner that goes through additional education and is
granted the privilege of carrying a concealed weapon, there is no height78. Id. (citing In re Cowley, 461 S.E.2d 804, 806 (1995)).
79. Huckelba, 771 S.E.2d at 822.
80. Haskins, 585 S.E.2d at 769.
81. Id.
82. Huckelba, 771 S.E.2d at 822.
83. Sasha Goldstein, One dead, gunman at large, after shooting on Wayne Community College
campus in Golsdboro, N.C.: officials, NEW YORK DAILY NEWS (April 13, 2015),
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/crime/shooting-reported-wayne-community-college-campus-narticle- 1.2183236.
84. Huckelba, 771 S.E.2d at 823.
85. Id. at 823.
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ened level of responsibility; they are simply held unaccountable for their
ignorance of a particular situation. In a location that carries a zero tolerance
policy for guns, 86 it seems that there is a level of forgiveness for those citizens that have a lapse of judgment and unknowingly carry a dangerous
weapon onto educational property, regardless of their education on firearm
safety.
Second, the court sought to eliminate any further arguments that the
ownership of a gun on school grounds can be considered a "prohibited activity [that] deals with 'public welfare' or 'regulatory' offenses." 87 Haskins
attempted to protect public safety in schools by instituting criminal penalties without any finding of criminal intent while deliberately avoiding any
discussion of constitutional rights as presented by Staples.88 Instead, they
declared it was in the interest of public safety to create such strict regulations, basing it on their interpretation of the legislative intent behind N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 14-269.2.89
The Haskins decision was reached in 2003, in the wake of the horrific
Columbine massacre of 1999 that alerted a nation to the growing epidemic
of incidents involving weapons on school campuses. 90 The court was well
aware of increasing public concern to the dangers of firearms on educational property and the growing issue of school shootings. 91 Through their decision, the court took measures to increase public safety in the school system by imposing harsher regulations on gun owners. 92 Huckelba, on the
other hand, approached the issue as the court did in Staples (which was
decided five years before Columbine), and sided with the rights of the gun
owners and ignored the growing concern for increased safety on educational property, declaring that gun possession93does not fall under the exception
for public welfare or regulatory offenses.
In the years since Columbine, the violence in schools has not subsided; in
fact, it has become arguably more prevalent, and even seems to be occurring more regularly in other public places such as movie theaters 94 and

86. N.C. GEN. STAT. § II 5C-390. 10 (2011).

87. Id. at 818.
88. Id. at 821 (citing Haskins, 585 S.E.2d at 768).
89. Haskins, 585 S.E.2d at 769 (interpreting the statute's enactment as a method of "detcr[ring]
students and others from bringing any type of gun onto school grounds" because of "the increased
necessity for safety in our schools").
90. See Haskins, 585 S.E.2d at 766.
91. Id. at 769 (citing In re Cowley, 461 S.E.2d. at 806).
92. Id. at 769.
93. Huckelba, 771 S.E.2d at 818.
94. Eliana Dockterman, Theater Madness, TIME (August 14, 2015), http://time.com/movie-theatershootings/.
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churches.95 As a whole, the public is quite aware of the escalating issue of
guns on school property and the increased need for stricter regulation to
ensure the safety of their children. Most people are well aware that schools
have zero tolerance policies for carrying weapons on their grounds, and that
there are penalties in place for violating those policies. In Cook, the court
recognized an exception to allow for a strict liability standard when the
96
defendant should have known his conduct was subject to strict regulation.
In Huckelba, the Defendant was well aware of the regulation prohibiting
her conduct, 97 but the court nonetheless found that N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14269.2 did not "implicate conduct that is subject to public regulation." 98
Although the court in Staples felt that even highly dangerous items can
be so commonplace that the public is not aware of the "likelihood of strict
regulation," in light of the continuing increase in school shootings and the
considerable national attention they garner,99 it is arguable that most of the
public is already aware that there are strict regulations in place for the possession of firearms on school property.'0° With the overwhelming public
awareness to the escalating problem posed by guns in our school system,
most people would not only feel regulations are likely to exist, but they
would expect strict public regulation for violations of N.C. GEN. STAT. §
14-269.2.
Even though there are cases where an exception has been made because
of public safety and welfare,' ° ' the Huckelba court holds firmly that a gun
owner's rights should not be impeded. Haskins tried to establish stringent
guidelines to protect school children, but Huckelba held firmly that the
freedoms granted to gun owners were paramount.' 0 2 As Haskins recognized, the purpose of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-269.2 was to deter students
from bringing guns on school property in order to provide safety for the
children in our schools. 0 3 In order to provide that protection, Haskins realized that an exception would have to be made, because the public safety and
welfare of children was the principal concern. 104
95. Francie Diep, Church Shootings Happen Often Enough That There's a NationalChurch Shooting Database, PACIFIC STANDARD (June 19, 2015), http://www.psmag.compolitics-and-law/researchon-shootings-in-churches.
96. United States v. Cook, 76 F.3d 596, 601 (4th Cir. 1996) (involving defendant who sold illegal
drugs, but did not know his partner was a minor).
97. Huckelba, 771 S.E.2d at 813.
98. Id. at 820.
99. Staples, 411 U.S. at 611 (deciding case five years before the Columbine massacre).
100. Id. at 611 (citing the Government's argument that "guns are subject to an array of regulations
at the federal, state, and local levels that put gun owners on notice..
101. Huckelba, 771 S.E. 2d at 818.
102. Id. at 823.
103. Haskins, 585 S.E.2d at 769 (citing In re Cowley, 461 S.E.2d at 806).
104. Id. at 768.

https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol38/iss1/5

12

Wolff: Firing Back: State v. Huckelba Takes Aim at Precedent, Impacting

NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAWREVIEW

92

[Vol. 38:80

The federal courts have consistently held that there is a "long tradition of
widespread lawful gun ownership by private individuals in this country,"
and Huckelba seems to presume that "long tradition" is more important
than the changing laws 0in5 a modem approach to increase the public's safety
in our nation's schools.'
V.

CONCLUSION

The holding of State v. Huckelba, while in line with several federal cases,
is just another step in the opposite direction for protection against firearms
in North Carolina schools. The impact of Huckelba will have a lasting effect on the imposition of stricter regulations on gun owners, as the court
took pains to reinforce the importance of protecting gun owners' constitutional rights at the expense of protecting the public from possible dangers
on educational property. 106 The implications of the passing of the 2011 bill,
which ultimately amended the language of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-269.2, are
still reverberating as is evident through the overturning of the Haskins decision, which sought to provide more protection for the State's school system
in the interests of public safety." 7
As the fight for gun control increases across the country, this case will
display the position of the North Carolina court system as one that supports
the rights of its gun owners over the safety of the general public for fear of
criminalizing conduct that would be innocent but for the ignorance of the
defendant's conduct.' 0 8 As the inappropriate use of firearms in our nation's
schools continues, North Carolina gun owners have little to fear as 0the
9
"long tradition of widespread lawful gun ownership" is sure to continue.

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Huckelba, 771 S.E.2dat 818.
Id. at 817.
Haskins, 585 S.E.2d at 769 (citing In re Cowley, 461 S.E.2d at 806).
See Huckelba, 771 S.E.2d at 817.
Id. at 818.
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